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Abstract: Safety critical systems developed as part of a product line must still comply with safety 
standards. Standards use the concept of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) to drive the assignment of system 
safety requirements to components of a system under design. However, for a Software Product Line 
(SPL), the safety requirements that need to be allocated to a component may vary in different products. 
Variation in design can indeed change the possible hazards incurred in each product, their causes, and 
can alter the safety requirements placed on individual components in different SPL products. Establishing 
common SILs for components of a large scale SPL by considering all possible usage scenarios, is 
desirable for economies of scale, but it also poses challenges to the safety engineering process. In this 
paper, we propose a method for automatic allocation of SILs to components of a product line. The 
approach is applied to a Hybrid Braking System SPL design. 
Keywords: safety-critical product lines; safety requirements; SILs; requirements allocation. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The term Software Product Line (SPL) refers to a software 
development approach that enables software reuse by 
allowing the creation of software applications through the 
composition of common and variable features that address 
the requirements of a particular domain (Clements and 
Northrop, 2001). Features represent desired functionality 
from the user point of view (Lee et al. 2002).  Product line 
design maximizes software reuse across products but must 
still yield safe individual products and this poses research 
challenges.  
In general safety assessment processes in many industries 
move into a direction where safety is addressed from the 
early stages. Safety requirements for a system are captured 
early on and are progressively allocated to subsystems and 
components of the architecture. The process must guarantee 
that, at the end, if the component requirements are met, the 
system requirements are also met. This type of allocation of 
requirements is seen as important because it provides a way 
in which safety is controlled from early stages and is not left 
to emerge or not at the end. Can we transfer this type of top-
down thinking about safety in SPL design? This is the 
question that is addressed in this paper. 
Safety standards use the concept of Safety Integrity Levels 
(SILs) to assign safety requirements of different stringencies 
to components of a system. They take the form of 
Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) in the ISO 
26262 (ISO, 2011) standard for passenger cars, and 
Development Assurance Levels (DALs) in aerospace safety 
standards (EUROCAE, 2010). SILs are assigned early in the 
system design process at system level, just after the system 
hazards have been identified. These hazards are given more 
or less stringent SILs depending on how high are the risks 
they pose. As the system architecture is being refined, SILs 
assigned to system-level hazards are iteratively allocated to 
subsystems and components. ASIL Decomposition is a 
process that allows for a safety-critical architecture to meet a 
particular target ASIL assigned to a hazard without all 
components contributing to the hazard having to meet that 
target. For example, if a hazard can be caused only when two 
independent components fail together, these components can 
share the responsibility of meeting the ASIL allocated to that 
hazard, rather than each one having to meet the original 
ASIL.  
ISO 26262 defines an integer algebra for ASIL 
decomposition which is loosely derived from rules about 
combining probabilities. Each ASIL is equivalent to an 
integer value: QM (Quality Management) = 0, A = 1, B = 2, 
C= 3, and D = 4. The ASIL algebra defines that if n 
components must fail simultaneously to cause a given hazard, 
the total ASIL assigned to these n components must add up to 
the ASIL of the hazard they originate. So, two redundant 
components assuring a function of ASIL D might 
individually only be required to meet ASIL B because 
together they produce the total required ASIL value (2 + 2 = 
4). Higher ASILs mean higher costs, because meeting more 
stringent safety requirements typically requires more safety 
measures, more effort, and higher-quality components. 
  
     
 
Therefore, component ASILs could significantly affect both 
development and production costs. ASIL decomposition 
allows to efficiently allocate requirements so that we can 
meet the safety requirements without being unnecessarily 
stringent or expensive.  
More specifically, recent Model-Based Safety Assessment 
(MSBA) techniques can potentially provide frameworks for 
SILs allocation, by allowing us to automatically identify 
combinations of component failures that lead to system 
hazards, and therefore by locating opportunities for SIL 
decomposition. HiP-HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard 
Origin & Propagation Studies) (Papadopoulos et al. 2011) is 
an advanced MBSA technique that already provides such an 
approach for ISO 26262. HiP-HOPS implements a 
combination of model-based, automated Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) process and a Tabu Search (TS) (Azevedo et al. 2013) 
meta-heuristic optimization algorithm, allowing optimal 
ASIL allocation and has shown to scale up to complex 
systems.  
Although application of the MBSA process to SPL design 
would be beneficial, this is not straightforward. As safety is 
context-dependent, hazards, their causes, and the 
requirements allocated to SPL components may change 
according to the selection of SPL variants in a particular 
product (Habli, 2011). Such variation may change the safety 
requirements (i.e., the SILs) placed on components in 
different products of the SPL. Thereby, establishing safety 
requirements for SPL components requires finding the SILs 
allocated to those components in different products. If a 
component is allocated different SILs in different products 
then the highest requirement must be met for the component 
to be used safely across SPL products. This type of allocation 
would allow developers to meet their responsibilities in order 
to assure the safety of the SPL architecture, and to comply 
with safety standards, without incurring the unnecessary high 
costs of complete reanalysis and reallocation of safety 
requirements as traditionally demanded for each product. 
However, the establishment of product line component 
ASILs in a large scale SPL, like a family of automotive 
powertrain controllers with potentially hundreds of members, 
can be challenging.  
Safety standards do not show how this can be done in large 
scale, e.g. via automation, and no framework has yet been 
developed to support the automatic allocation of SILs 
compatible with, and useful in the context of, SPLs. Indeed, 
although emerging SIL allocation tools and techniques 
(Azevedo et al. 2014; Parker et al. 2013; Papadopoulos et al. 
2010; Mader et al. 2012; Bieber et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 
2010; Lee et al. 2009; Sallak et al. 2008; Dhouibi et al. 2014) 
provide the capability of automatically allocate SILs to single 
SPL products, they do not address product lines.  
The novelty of this paper is precisely a concept for allocation 
of SILs to components in product line design, and a method 
and tool to provide the automated support to apply that 
concept. The tool is tailored upon HiP-HOPS (Azevedo et al. 
2014) and is applied to the automotive domain. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of HiP-
HOPS and its Tabu Search ASIL allocation approach. Section 
3 describes the method and tool to automatically allocate 
SILs to SPL components from the analysis of multi-product 
SILs allocations. Section 4 presents the case study and 
evaluation, and section 5 shows related work. Finally, section 
6 presents the conclusion and future research. 
2. HiP-HOPS AND TABU SEARCH 
HiP-HOPS (Papadopoulos et al. 2011) is a method and tool 
for Model-based Safety Analysis, in which system models 
showing components and material energy, and data 
transactions among them are augmented with local failure 
logic. These models are then analyzed to create forms of 
safety analysis such as fault trees and Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEAs). The HiP-HOPS tool receives the 
system description as input in an XML schema, but the 
various instantiations of the tool, e.g. its connection to 
MATLAB/Simulink, also provide a failure editor that can be 
used together with graphical interfaces to augment the model 
with safety information. Using this editor it is possible to 
specify hazards related to system malfunctions, and the 
failure logic of components described mainly as sets of 
output deviations and how they are caused by logical 
combinations of internal component failures and deviations 
of the component inputs. Once the system models have been 
annotated with hazards and local failure logic, HiP-HOPS 
synthesizes fault trees for each hazard, and then combines 
them to create an FMEA for the system. 
HiP-HOPS rationalizes allocation and decomposition of 
ASILs to system components, by showing how combinations 
of component failures lead to system hazards. For allocation 
to happen, the potential fault propagation of the system must 
be defined, to determine which component(s) potentially 
contribute to each function failure. The rationale is that a 
component that contributes to a system failure only in 
conjunction with other components may receive a lower SIL 
than a component which directly causes the system failure. 
Thus the design intention of components, and specifically 
their ability to detect, mask or propagate failures, influences 
SIL allocation across the architecture; for example, some 
components may be designed to fail silent in response to 
failure, possibly transforming a severe failure mode into a 
less severe failure mode. The contribution of components to 
hazards can be established using the analysis capabilities of 
HiP-HOPS and the synthesized fault trees produced by the 
tool. A fault tree for instance provides the minimal cut sets 
(i.e. combinations of basic events) that result in system-level 
hazards, and therefore can be used to identify ASIL 
Decomposition opportunities. 
It is often the case that the failure of the same component is 
present in multiple cut sets and all of them must be taken into 
account when finding the most advantageous allocation 
solutions. Furthermore, with the increase in the number of 
components within a system, the number of ASIL allocation 
possibilities increases exponentially. Early implementations 
of exhaustive algorithms (Papadopoulos et al. 2010) for 
allocation in HiP-HOPS were found inadequate in coping 
with the complexity of realistic models. Investigations were, 
therefore, directed towards meta-heuristics such as genetic 
algorithms. These optimization algorithms are known to find 
  
     
 
good solutions, through guided search of a small fraction of 
the entire search space. In addition, they are known to be 
robust in dealing with a variety of problems.  
Meta-heuristics do not guarantee finding optimal solutions; 
however, they are capable of providing near optimal 
allocations within acceptable time spans. Many meta-
heuristics exist, and recent research has been testing some of 
the most popular ones on the ASIL Allocation optimization 
problem. Tabu Search (Azevedo et al. 2014) has shown 
promising results in both the quality of the solutions found as 
well as processing times. The TS extension of HiP-HOPS 
draws from the work of Hansen and Lih (1996) for reliability 
optimization and it goes by the name of Steepest Descent 
Mildest Ascent (SDMA). The method consists of iteratively 
finding the ASIL that by being decremented reduces the cost 
of a solution (the steepest descent direction).  
3. AUTOMATIC ALLOCATION OF SAFETY 
INTEGRITY LEVELS TO PRODUCT LINE 
COMPONENTS 
In this work we extended the above capabilities to enable 
allocation of safety requirements to components of a product 
line. The concept extends the capabilities of the HiP-HOPS 
method and tool for application in SPL design. The key idea 
is the ability to automatically instantiate a large set of 
products of an SPL from a variable SPL model augmented 
with possible hazards and the local failure logic of 
components. Products are then sent in a loop to HiP-HOPS, 
which performs ASIL allocation for each product. 
Components may receive different allocations in different 
products, so the ability to use safely a component across a 
range of products means selecting the highest allocation 
given by this analysis. 
The process was implemented in a prototype tool developed 
using Java as a compliment to HiP-HOPS. The tool requires a 
pre-processing step to support the augmentation of SPL 
variability models with hazards and failure logic and the 
enumeration of all products of an SPL via resolution of 
variability (i.e. product derivation). The latter can be a 
selective manual process or an automated process. The 
automated implementation of this feature has been done in 
MATLAB/Simulink using a range of mechanisms to specify 
variability and with the support of the product line variability 
management tool  Hephaestus/Simulink (Steiner et al. 2013). 
Alternative tools include the Common Variability Language 
(CVL) implemented in Eclipse (Haugen et al. 2008). 
Simulink variability patterns (Steiner et al. 2013; Botterweck 
et al. 2010) representing optional (Enabler subsystems), 
alternative (Switch blocks), and inclusive-or (Integration 
blocks) features have been used for modelling variation in the 
SPL architecture. The variability management tool 
Hephaestus/Simulink was used in this approach to support 
the variability modelling in Simulink models using these 
patterns. The automated derivation of the enumerated SPL 
product models augmented with hazards and failure logic 
requires the specification of the configuration knowledge. 
This provides a set of rules showing how SPL design assets, 
hazards, and failure logic can be composed in a product. 
Rules are specified according to feature model constraints. 
The feature model captures structural or conceptual 
relationships between common and variable functions of 
products of a domain (Lee et al. 2002). 
SPL configuration knowledge is specified by means of 
Hephaestus/Simulink by applying the following steps: 1) 
specify the feature expressions in the scope of the usage 
scenarios described in the feature model. A feature 
expression may include a single feature or a combination 
between two or more features; 2) for each feature expression, 
determine the SPL design elements to be included and 
excluded; and 3) specify the hazards, the allocated safety 
requirements, and the failure logic to be included/excluded in 
each feature expression.  
After performing these steps, the mapping between product 
line features, design elements, hazards and the allocated 
safety requirements, and component failure logic is obtained. 
Additional details on how to use product line variability 
management tools to specify the configuration knowledge 
can be found in (Steiner et al. 2013). Finally, the variability 
management tool was adapted by implementing an 
instantiation script with the support of a feature model 
reasoner, in this case the T-wise covering arrays algorithm 
(Johansen et al. 2012), to automatically derive a set of SPL 
products according to the constraints specified in the feature 
model. 
Once a range of SPL products have been enumerated from a 
variable SPL model, the products (i.e., system models 
annotated with failure information) are then provided to HiP-
HOPS for analysis. The ASIL allocations generated by 
applying HiP-HOPS to the enumeration of the SPL products 
are the inputs to the tool developed in this paper. HiP-HOPS 
exports the ASIL allocation of each individual product in an 
XML file. An extension tool parses each one of these files 
and performs the analysis. Firstly, the tool analyses the XML 
files one by one to obtain the ASILs allocated to SPL 
components in each product. This is done by analysing the 
ASILs allocated to the failure modes associated to each SPL 
component in each individual product. The most stringent 
ASIL allocated to a failure mode associated to a particular 
component is the component ASIL in that product. For each 
product, this is repeated for all components belonging to the 
product. After obtaining the ASILs allocated to product line 
components in each product, for each SPL component, the 
analysis is performed as follows: the ASILs allocated to a 
particular SPL component in different products are analysed 
in order to verify the most stringent ASIL allocated to that 
component across the SPL. Thus, we have obtained the ASIL 
that each SPL component should meet, and the results, i.e. 
ASILs allocated to all SPL components are exported in an 
XML file.  
4. EVALUATION 
The method and tool was applied to a Hybrid Braking System 
(De Castro et al. 2011) automotive product line (HBS-SPL). 
Hazard analysis and the definition of local failure logic were 
performed based on failure logic analysis technique 
supported by HiP-HOPS, and taking into account the 
  
     
 
interactions between HBS-SPL components expressed in the 
feature model. Three HBS-SPL products (i.e., usage 
scenarios) were considered in the evaluation of the proposed 
method: HBS four wheels braking (HBS-4WB), HBS front 
wheels braking (HBS-FWB), and HBS rear wheels braking 
(HBS-RWB). 
The HBS-SPL is a prototype automotive braking system SPL 
designed in MATLAB/Simulink. HBS-SPL is meant for 
electrical vehicles integration, in particular for propulsion 
architectures that integrate one electrical motor per wheel. 
The term hybrid comes from the fact that braking is achieved 
throughout the combined action of the electrical In-Wheel 
Motors (IWMs) and frictional Electromechanical Brakes 
(EMBs). One of the most important features of this system is 
that the integration of IWM in the braking process allows an 
increase in the vehicle’s range: while braking, IWMs work as 
generators and transform the vehicles kinetic energy into 
electrical energy that is fed into the powertrain battery. IWMs 
have, however, braking torque availability limitations at high 
wheel speeds or when the powertrain battery is close to full 
state of charge. EMBs are introduced to provide the torque 
needed to match the total braking demand. HBS-SPL 
components can be combined in different ways according to 
the constraints specified in HBS-SPL feature model presented 
in Fig. 1. The feature model was designed using the 
cardinality-based notation (Czarnecki et al. 2004).  
 
Fig. 1 HBS-SPL feature model. 
The HBS-SPL feature model includes wheel braking 
alternative features: Brake_Unit1_Front, Brake_Unit2_Front, 
Brake_Unit3_Rear, and Brake_Unit4_Rear aimed to provide 
the braking for each wheel. The three HBS products 
described earlier have a common principle: a Mechanical 
Pedal is responsible for capturing the driver’s braking 
demands; an Electronic Pedal senses these actions and 
transforms them into braking requests for each wheel that is 
equipped with braking features; subsequently, it sends these 
requests via a duplex bus communication system to the Brake 
Units. Each Brake Unit integrates a Wheel Node Controller 
that calculates the amount of braking torque to be produced 
by each actuator. Commands are generated accordingly and 
sent to the power converters to control the 2 braking devices. 
While braking, power flows from the IWMs to the 
Powertrain Battery and from the vehicle’s low voltage 
Auxiliary Battery to the EMBs. The elements of the vehicle’s 
power architecture should be regarded as subsystems that 
include multiple components – the Powertrain Battery, for 
example, integrates a Battery Management System (BMS) 
which is composed by complex hardware and software 
elements. 
Hazards can arise in this system from the interaction between 
design elements in a range of usage scenarios. Safety 
requirements placed to a particular HBS-SPL hazard may 
also change according to contextual elements such as 
operational environment, safety standards, and regulations. 
These elements can be represented in product line context 
models (Lee et al. 2002). In this paper we have limited 
ourselves to performing the HBS-SPL hazard analysis based 
only on the SPL feature model. Product line features stand for 
system functions implemented by design elements (e.g. 
system, subsystems, components). 
Performing a hazard analysis covering all possible scenarios 
for HBS-SPL would yield voluminous results. Nevertheless, 
scoping the hazard analysis to a set of products has shown 
some degree of reuse for safety analysis assets (e.g. fault 
trees, FMEA, ASIL allocation). Wheel Braking variation 
point specified in the HBS-SPL feature model was 
considered in the hazard analysis. From the analysis of Wheel 
Braking variation point and mandatory elements of HBS-
SPL, as mentioned earlier, the following usage scenarios 
were established: HBS-4WB; HBS-FWB; and HBS-RWB. 
These scenarios were analysed from the safety perspective. 
Table 1 presents the identified hazards, their causes, and the 
allocated ASILs (Automotive Safety Integrity Levels). Table 
1 also presents the association between the hazards and the 
usage scenarios by means of the column “Scenario”. 
Table 1. HBS-SPL hazards and ASIL allocation. 
Scenario Hazard Causes ASIL 
 
 
HBS-
4WB 
No braking 
four wheels 
Omission of all brake unit 
actuators outputs. 
D 
No braking 
three wheels 
Omission of brake unit1, and 
brake unit2, and brake unit3 
actuators outputs. 
D 
No braking 
front 
Omission of brake unit1 and 
brake unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
No braking 
rear 
Omission of brake unit3 and 
brake_unit4 actuators outputs. 
C 
No braking 
diagonal 
Omission of brake unit1 and 
brake unit4 actuators outputs or 
Omission of brake unit2 and 
brake unit4 actuators outputs. 
C 
Value 
braking 
Incorrect Value of all brake unit 
actuators outputs 
D 
HBS-
FWB  
No braking 
front 
Omission of brake unit1 and 
brake unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
Value 
braking 
Incorrect Value of brake unit1 
and brake unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
HBS-
RWB  
No braking 
rear 
Omission of brake unit3 and 
brake unit4 actuators outputs. 
D 
Value 
braking 
Incorrect Value of brake unit3 
and brake unit4 actuators outputs. 
D 
It is considered that no braking is being produced in a wheel 
whenever both braking devices of that wheel (an IWM and an 
EMB) are omitting their outputs. Braking with an incorrect 
value happens when at least one of the braking actuators is 
providing braking torque that is higher or lower than the 
values demanded. In order to simplify the case study, we 
  
     
 
have only discussed the allocation of ASILs to product line 
hazards on the basis of the severity (rather than the full ISO 
26262 risk assessment process). In a product line hazard 
analysis, different ASILs can be assigned to the same hazard 
considering different usage scenarios for product line 
components. For example, the ASIL allocated to the “No 
braking rear” hazard is more stringent in HBS-RWB scenario 
and less stringent in HBS-4WB. Causes for a particular 
hazard can also change according to how product line 
components can be composed in a product.   
The causes for the “Value braking” hazard in HBS-FWB are 
different from the causes for that hazard in HBS-RWB. HBS-
SPL hazards and ASIL allocation information are stored by 
HiP-HOPS in the failure model. From analysis of HBS-SPL 
hazards (Table 1), 77 failure logic expressions were added to 
30 HBS-SPL components; through different fault 
propagations, the causes described in these expressions 
combine and give rise to hazards in different product 
configurations. This process was automated as product 
models augmented with hazards and local failure logic were 
sent to HiP-HOPS which created fault trees, failure cut sets, 
and FMEA results for each HBS-SPL product.   
The fault trees generated for the HBS-SPL products provided 
the input for the HiP-HOPS allocation algorithm. The 
allocation was performed for each HBS-SPL product based 
on the following example cost heuristic that expresses the 
relative cost jumps of developing a component according to 
the different ASILs: 0 (ASIL QM), 10 (ASIL A), 20 (ASIL 
B), 40 (ASIL C), and 50 (ASIL D). This expression was used 
for illustrative purposes, but any other that the system 
designer finds more suitable can be used instead. We have set 
the algorithm stopping criteria to 5000 iterations without 
improvements. All algorithm executions were carried in a 
computer equipped with an Intel i5 processor clocked at 
2.5GHz and 6GB of RAM.  
The HBS-4WB, HBS-FWB, and HBS-RWB ASIL 
allocations provided by HiP-HOPS analysis were the inputs 
for performing the analysis to allocate ASILs to components. 
The analysis was also carried in the same computer. The 
ASILs allocated to 30 HBS-SPL components in three 
different products were analyzed and the process took 14 
seconds to complete. Table 2 presents the ASILs allocated to 
HBS-SPL components in each product, and the final ASILs 
allocated to HBS-SPL components (column “ASIL”). Due to 
space limitations, Table 2 presents ASILs allocated to 16 
HBS-SPL components. 
ASILs allocated to a particular HBS-SPL component may 
change according to the product. For example, the ASILs 
allocated to Brake_Unit1, Brake_Unit1.EMB, and 
Brake_Unit1.EMB_Power_Converter components are 
respectively “A”, “A”, and “A” in HBS-4WB, and “QM”, 
“B”, and “B” in HBS-FWB. The ASIL costs related to each 
HBS-SPL product ASIL allocation was also generated by the 
tool. The tool also generated the ASIL cost for the HBS-SPL 
(cell “Cost for the MAX ASIL” on Table 2). The HBS-SPL 
ASIL cost is higher than the product costs as it represents the 
worst case where any component of the SPL is designed to be 
safely used across all products of the SPL.  
Table 2. HBS-SPL products HIP-HOPS Tabu Search 
ASIL decomposition results. 
HBS-SPL 
Component Name 
HBS-
4WB 
ASIL 
HBS-
FWB 
ASIL 
HBS-
RWB 
ASIL 
MAX 
ASIL 
Auxiliary_Battery D (4) D (4) D (4) D (4) 
Brake_Unit1 A (1) QM (0) - A (1) 
Brake_Unit1.EMB A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
Brake_Unit1.EMB_ 
Power_Converter 
A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
Brake_Unit1.IWM A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
Brake_Unit1.IWM_ 
Power_Converter 
A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
… … … … … 
Brake_Unit4 A (1) - B (2)  B (2)  
Brake_Unit4.EMB A (1) - B (2) B (2) 
Brake_Unit4.EMB_ 
Power_Converter 
D (4) - B (2) D (4) 
Brake_Unit4.IWM QM (0) - B (2) B (2) 
Brake_Unit4.IWM_ 
Power_Converter 
B (2) - B (2) B (2) 
Communication_Bus1 B (2) B (2) B (2) B (2) 
Communication_Bus2 B (2) B (2) B (2) B (2) 
Electronic_Pedal D (4) D (4)  D (4) D (4) 
Mechanical_Pedal D (4) D (4) D (4) D (4) 
Electronic_Pedal D (4) D (4) D (4) D (4) 
Cost 520 460 470 730 
Analysis of these results about the implications on safety 
requirements of possible usage of components provides 
useful feedback to the SPL development process, 
contributing to meeting safety requirements without incurring 
unnecessary costs.    
The tool developed for this work was tested against 
performance requirements in this case study. The processing 
time to analyze 72 hybrid braking system SPL products was 
reasonable, about 4 minute and 40 seconds, considering that 
the complexity of the analysis has increased substantially as 
the numbers of the products increased. 
5. RELATED WORK 
In earlier work, Papadopoulos et al. (2010) proposed an 
approach to automatically allocate ASILs to subsystems and 
components of a hierarchical system model according to ISO 
26262. The ASIL allocation and decomposition algorithm 
was implemented in HiP-HOPS (Papadopoulos et al. 2011). 
The HiP-HOPS ASIL allocation algorithm was further 
improved with optimization heuristics to reach an optimal 
allocation. Penalty-based (Parker et al. 2013) and Tabu 
Search (Azevedo et al. 2014) algorithms were implemented 
to improve the performance of ASIL allocation in large scale 
systems.  
Mader et al. (2012) proposed an approach for ASIL 
allocation focused on finding optimal allocations; a linear 
programming optimization problem is formulated to discover 
a solution that minimizes the sum of ASILs assigned across 
the system architecture. Zhang et al. (2010) proposed a 
workflow for embedded system development, which includes 
fault trees, FMEA, and ASIL allocation based on a qualitative 
risk graph method. Dhouibi et al. (2014) introduced a method 
for ASIL allocation which is based on interpreting the 
allocation problem as a system of linear equations. Bieber et 
al. (2011) presented a theory to formalize the ARP 4754a 
DAL allocation rules (EUROCAE, 2010) and the 
  
     
 
DALculator tool to support automatic DAL allocation. Lee et 
al. (2009) presented an approach based on fault trees and 
their top-events (i.e., probabilities for failure on demand) to 
derive SILs for system functions according to IEC 61508. A 
fuzzy probabilistic SILs allocation technique in compliance 
with IEC 61508 was also proposed in (Sallak et al. 2008).  
Existing tools and techniques for automatic allocation of SILs 
were not designed to address product lines. These techniques 
we hope can benefit from the concepts sketched in this paper. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We described a method for allocation of SILs to components 
in product line design. A prototype tool was developed which 
performs automatic ASIL allocation for product line 
components taking into account their possible usage across 
the product line. We have discussed, both in theory and 
through an example, how the use of such a method and tool 
can potentially reduce the cost of SPL development by 
allocating less stringent ASILs to SPL components whilst 
meeting safety requirements. Through this technique, it is 
possible to specify safety requirements for components 
anticipating their possible use in a number of products. This 
work addresses an important issue and extends and automates 
principles enshrined in modern safety standards to SPL 
design.  
Further work needs to be done to elucidate and explain the 
preparation and automatic resolution of variable models 
augmented with failure analyses that can be used in the frame 
of this method. Additional research is also ongoing to 
validate this approach in different industrial context. 
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